Online Appendix

Working-Class Legislators and Perceptions of Representation in Latin America

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Appendix A: Coding Rules and Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Coding Rules for Legislators' Social Class – USAL Occupational Categories

Occupational Class	Specific Occupation
Working Class	Laborer
	Service Industry Worker
	Union officer
Non-Working Class	All other occupational categories
No Information	Retiree
	Student
	Housewife
	Unemployed

Source: Carnes and Lupu (2015a)

Table A2 Coding Rules for Citizens' Social Class (LAPOP Occupational Categories)

Occupational Class	Specific Occupation (variable ocup1)
Working Class	4) Skilled worker (machinist, mechanic, carpenter, etc.) 6) Office Worker 8) Food vendor 9) Service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, etc.) 11) Farmhand (works for others, does not own land) 13) Domestic servant 14) Servant
Non-working class	1) Professional, intellectual, or scientist 2) Manager 3) Technical or mid-level professional 5) Government official 7) Businessperson 10) Farmer 12) Artisan 15) Member of the armed forces

Note: Note: Our sample of country-years used to test *Hypothesis 1* is limited by the LAPOP question about respondents' occupation (ocup1), which we use to test our hypothesis about working-class citizens. This particular occupation question is asked in all 2008 LAPOP surveys, but it only appears in the 2010 questionnaires for Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Uruguay.
Source (Carnes and Lupu 2015a).

Table A3. List of Countries and Survey Waves Included in the Analysis

Country	LAPOP year	Corresponding PELA wave [a]
Argentina	2008, 2010	4, 5
Bolivia	2008	4
Brazil	2008, 2010	3, 4
Chile	2008, 2010	4, 5
Colombia	2008, 2010	4, 5
Costa Rica	2008, 2010	4
Dominican Republic	2008, 2010	4
Ecuador	2008, 2010	4, 5
El Salvador	2008	5
Guatemala	2008, 2010	3, 4
Honduras	2008, 2010	4, 5
Mexico	2008	5
Nicaragua	2008, 2010	4
Panama	2008, 2010	3, 4
Paraguay	2008	3
Peru	2008, 2010	3
Uruguay	2008, 2010	3, 4
Venezuela	2008	2

Note: Our dependent variable for "legislative accomplishment" is only asked in the 2008 LAPOP for all countries and in the 2010 LAPOP for Honduras.

[a] The PELA wave corresponds to the most recent available elite data prior to the date that LAPOP fielded the AmericasBarometer in each country. Each wave of the USAL PELA survey is carried out over a multi-year period corresponding to countries' legislative periods, so the wave that corresponds to the 2008 and 2010 LAPOP survey varies. In countries where the legislative period started in the same year as the LAPOP survey, we made sure that the legislative elections happened before the LAPOP survey was conducted. For the 2010 LAPOP wave, legislative elections in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic happened after LAPOP fielded the AmericasBarometer, so for these two country-years of LAPOP, we use PELA data from the wave ending in 2010.

Table A4. Descriptive Statistics Leftist Parties and Percent Workers in the Legislature

	Legislator's Party Placement	Legislator's Self-Placement
Correlation between % Workers and % Left Party		
Country-Year Level Dataset	r=.32	r=.23
Individual Level Dataset	r=.29	r=.22
Workers as a Percentage of each party category		
Workers as % of Left Party	6.16%	7.00%
Workers as % of Center Party	4.40%	4.82%
Workers as % of Right Party	4.57%	4.07%
Percentage of Workers in each party category		
% of Workers in Left Party	31.62%	41.18%
% of Workers in Center Party	52.99%	55.88%
% of Workers in Right Party	15.38%	2.94%

Note: Table A4 shows the relationship between *percent workers* and *percent left parties* in the legislature in three ways. Using a USAL question that asks legislators to place their party (left column) and themselves (right column) on a 1-10 left-right scale, we calculated ideological positions for each party in our elite sample. A *left party* is defined as having a mean ideology score less than 4. Center parties have mean ideology scores between 4 and 7, and right parties have ideology scores greater than 7. Regardless of how we operationalize *left parties*, the measures of *percent workers* and *percent left parties* in the legislature are only weakly correlated.

One way to break down these data is to look at the distribution of workers and non-workers in each type of party. Using the measure based on legislators' placement of their own party, the average left party in our sample contains 6.16 percent workers. The average center party contains 4.40% workers, and the average right party contains 4.57% workers.

An alternative way to break down these figures is to look at the distribution of parties among working-class legislators. Among the workers in our elite sample (using the party placement measure), roughly 32 percent belong to left parties, and about 68 percent belong to center or right parties.

Table A5. Correlation between Percent Workers in the Legislature and Country-Level Variables

Control Variable	Country-Level Dataset	Individual Level Dataset
Personal Vote Seeking	0.11	0.24
GNI per capita	0.17	-0.27
%Left Party in Legislature	0.32	0.29
% Left Party (Self-Placement)	0.23	0.22
Left President in Power	0.08	-0.10
Freedom House	0.01	-0.04
Governance Quality	0.07	0.02
Programmatic Parties	0.32	0.35
Number of Observations	**31**	**49,844**

Table A5 shows the correlations between each of the country-level variables in our analyses (both in the manuscript and in the appendix) and our main variable of interest: Working-class representation. Column 1 list the names of the control variables, column 2 shows the correlations for each variable with percent workers in the legislature based on the country-year level dataset, and column 3 shows the correlations based on the individual-level dataset. The table indicates that none of the country level variables are strongly correlated with the percentage of workers in the legislature. This information is consistent with previous research indicating that scholars do not have a clear understanding of the factors that lead to greater working-class representation (Carnes 2016).

Figure A.1 Distribution of Legislative Approval Responses in Sample by Country-Year

Graphs by Country and Year

Note: Distribution of responses, by country-year in the sample, to the question: "Now speaking of Congress, and thinking of members and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe the members and representatives of Congress are performing their jobs very poorly (coded 1), poorly (2), neither poorly nor well (3), well (4), or very well (5)?"

Figure A.2 Distribution of Legislative Trust Responses in Sample by Country-Year

Graphs by Country and Year

Note: Distribution of responses, by country-year in the sample, to the question "On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means not at all and 7 the highest and means a lot, to what extent do you trust the National Congress?"

Figure A.3 Distribution of Legislative Accomplishment Responses in Sample by Country-Year

Note: Distribution of responses, by country-year in the sample, to the quesiton "Using a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means not at all and 7 means a lot, to what extent does the Congress accomplish what you would hope for it to do?"

Appendix B: Supplementary Analysis

Figure B.1 Working-Class Representation and Legislative Approval

Note: Predicted probabilities (lines) calculated using Table 1, Model 2. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. This figure compares the relationship between working-class descriptive representation and legislative approval for working-class and non-working class citizens.

Figure B.2 Working-Class Representation and Trust in the Legislature

Note: Predicted probabilities (lines) calculated using Table 1, Model 4. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. This figure compares the relationship between working-class descriptive representation and legislative trust for working-class and non-working class citizens.

F**igure B.3 Working-Class Representation and Legislative Accomplishment**

Note: Predicted probabilities (lines) calculated using Table 1, Model 6. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. This figure compares the relationship between working-class descriptive representation and legislative accomplishment for working-class and non-working class citizens.

Table B.1 Working-Class Rep. and Perceptions of Leg, Control for Governance Quality

|	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.06***	.05*	.05***	.05*	.06***	.05*
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)
Working Class Citizen		.10**		.06		.08*
		(.04)		(.04)		(.05)
% Workers in Legislature X Working Citizen		-.00		-.01		-.01
		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01**	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.16***	.17***	.19***	.18***	.19***	.17***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Income	-.23***	-.20***	-.04	-.20***	-.07	-.18**
	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)
Female	.19***	.17***	.12***	.07***	.13***	.12***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.10***	.07	-.02	-.00	.19***	.19***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.06)
Ideology=4-5	.10***	.03	.05*	.07*	.19***	.18***
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=6-7	.22***	.20***	.25***	.24***	.37***	.35***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.30***	.27***	.45***	.43***	.48***	.47***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.00**	-.00	-.00*
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.11***	.11***	.22***	.25***	.14***	.15***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.50***	-.54***	-.35***	-.35***	-.41***	-.42***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Married	-.02	.00	-.07***	-.04	-.05*	-.00
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Divorced	-.08**	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.11**	-.00
	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)
Country-Level Control						
Personal Vote-Seeking	.03	.04	.03	.04*	.03	.03
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)
%Left Party in Legislature	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Governance Quality	.35**	.23	.47***	.42***	.30**	.37**
	(.15)	(.18)	(.12)	(.16)	(.15)	(.15)
Observations	41830	19328	42699	19503	25170	12948
Country-Year N=	31	25	31	25	19	18
Wald Chi²	1321.39	698.15	1481.63	657.58	843.10	408.78

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.

Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.

Note: To assess whether countries with better state capacity are both more likely to have a larger percent of workers in office and also more likely to be positively evaluated by citizens, this table includes a measure of governance quality from the World Bank. We do not include this in the main model because governance quality is highly collinear with GNI per capita (economic development). The model demonstrates that *percent workers* has a strong positive relationship with each of the dependent variables, even when accounting for the governance quality.

Table B.2 Working-Class Rep. and Perceptions of Leg, Control for Level of Democracy

	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.07***	.06**	.06***	.06**	.07***	.05*
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Working Class Citizen		.10**		.06		.08*
		(.04)		(.04)		(.05)
% Workers in Legislature X Working Citizen		-.00		-.01		-.01
		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01**	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.16***	.17***	.19***	.18***	.19***	.17***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Income	-.23***	-.20***	-.04	-.20***	-.07	-.18**
	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)
Female	.19***	.17***	.12***	.07***	.13***	.12***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.10***	.07	-.02	.00	.19***	.19***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.06)
Ideology=4-5	.10***	.03	.05*	.08*	.19***	.18***
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=6-7	.22***	.20***	.25***	.24***	.37***	.35***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.30***	.27***	.45***	.43***	.48***	.47***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.00**	-.00	-.00*
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.11***	.11***	.22***	.25***	.14***	.15***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.50***	-.54***	-.35***	-.35***	-.41***	-.42***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Married	-.02	.00	-.07***	-.05	-.05*	-.00
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Divorced	-.08**	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.11**	-.00
	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)
Country-Level Control						
Personal Vote-Seeking	.05*	.05*	.05**	.06**	.04	.05*
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
%Left Party in Legislature	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01**	-.01	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Democracy (FH)	.07*	.05	.09***	.09**	.05	.08*
	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Observations	41830	19328	42699	19503	25170	12948
Country-Year N=	31	25	31	25	19	18
Wald Chi²	1317.88	697.85	1471.55	654.33	838.97	405.56

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.

Note: Based on the logic that places with better electoral processes may be more likely to both elect workers and to have better evaluations of legislatures, this table includes a measure of level of democracy from Freedom House. We do not include this in the main model because level of democracy is highly collinear with the GNI per capita. The model demonstrates that *percent workers* has a strong positive relationship with each of the dependent variables, even when accounting for the level of democracy.

Working-Class Legislators, Perceptions of Representation, and the Role of Left-Leaning Political Parties

Theoretically we argue that voters are more likely to trust and to positively evaluate the legislature when more working-class people are represented in the government. We do not argue that this relationship is explained by the share of seats held by left-leaning political parties. Nonetheless, we are careful to account for this possibility in our empirical model.

To account for the possibility that left-leaning political parties could explain both the number of workers in office and more positive evaluations of the legislature, we control for the percentage of seats held by left-leaning parties. The analysis presented in the main text uses a University of Salamanca (USAL) question that asks legislators to place their own party on a (1-10) left-right scale. We calculate the average ideological position for each party and control for the percentage of parties in each chamber with a mean score less than 4. Our results are robust to this model specification.

Appendix Tables B3-B4 show the results are robust to other measures of left-wing parties, including a similar measure from USAL that asks legislators' own ideological placement, rather than that of their party, and a dummy variable for *leftist-presidents* from the Database of Political Institutions.

Equally important, when we examine the descriptive data, we do not find a strong correlation between working-class legislators and the share of seats held by left-leaning political parties. Although in some countries, historically left-wing parties had ties with labor unions this is not the case across all of Latin America. The *percent leftist parties* and *percent workers* in the legislature is only weakly correlated (r=.32). Table A4 appendix further elucidates these relationships.

Table B.3 Working-Class Rep. and Perceptions of Leg, % Left Parties from Self-Placement

	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.07***	.06**	.06***	.06***	.07***	.06**
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Working Class Citizen		.10**		.06*		.08*
		(.04)		(.04)		(.05)
% Workers in Legislature X Working Citizen		-.00		-.01		-.01
		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01**	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.16***	.17***	.19***	.18***	.19***	.17***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Income	-.23***	-.20***	-.04	-.20***	-.07	-.18**
	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)
Female	.19***	.17***	.12***	.07***	.13***	.12***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.10***	.07	-.02	.00	.19***	.19***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.06)
Ideology=4-5	.10***	.03	.05*	.08*	.19***	.18***
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=6-7	.22***	.20***	.25***	.24***	.37***	.35***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.30***	.27***	.45***	.43***	.48***	.47***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.00**	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.11***	.11***	.23***	.25***	.14***	.15***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.50***	-.54***	-.35***	-.35***	-.41***	-.42***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Married	-.02	.00	-.07***	-.05	-.05*	-.00
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Divorced	-.08**	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.11**	-.00
	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)
Country-Level Control						
Personal Vote-Seeking	.03	.04	.03	.04	.03	.02
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
% Left Party (Self-Placement)	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
GNI per capita	2.32*	1.74	3.08***	3.09**	1.51	1.66
	(1.23)	(1.34)	(1.08)	(1.29)	(1.29)	(1.29)
Observations	41830	19328	42699	19503	25170	12948
Country-Year N=	31	25	31	25	19	18
Wald Chi²	1318.51	697.56	1469.17	651.42	836.36	401.32

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.

Note: We control for a measure of left-parties based on legislators' own ideological placement, rather than that of their party. The relationship between *percent workers* and perceptions of representation is robust to this model specification.

Table B.4 Working-Class Rep. and Perceptions of Legislature, Control for Left-President

	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.08***	.07***	.06***	.07***	.07***	.07***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Working Class Citizen		.10**		.06*		.08*
		(.04)		(.04)		(.05)
% Workers in Legislature X Working Citizen		-.00		-.01		-.01
		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01**	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.16***	.17***	.19***	.18***	.19***	.17***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Income	-.23***	-.20***	-.04	-.20***	-.07	-.19**
	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)
Female	.19***	.17***	.12***	.07***	.13***	.12***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.10***	.07	-.02	-.00	.19***	.18***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.06)
Ideology=4-5	.10***	.03	.05*	.08*	.19***	.18***
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=6-7	.22***	.20***	.25***	.24***	.37***	.35***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.30***	.27***	.45***	.43***	.48***	.47***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.00**	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.11***	.11***	.22***	.25***	.14***	.15***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.50***	-.54***	-.35***	-.35***	-.41***	-.42***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Single	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Married	-.02	.00	-.07***	-.05	-.05*	-.00
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Divorced	-.08**	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.11**	-.00
	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)
Country-Level Control						
Personal Vote-Seeking	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Left-President	.03**	.04**	.04***	.05***	.04**	.03**
	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
GNI per capita	2.35**	1.93	3.10***	3.33***	1.83	1.79
	(1.17)	(1.25)	(.98)	(1.13)	(1.16)	(1.17)
Observations	41830	19328	42699	19503	25170	12948
Country-Year N=	31	25	31	25	19	18
Wald Chi²	1323.98	704.00	1481.02	664.46	845.02	407.56

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.

Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.

Note: We control for the presence of a leftist president (from the Database of Political Institutions) instead of the percentage of left-parties in the legislature. The relationship between *percent workers* and perceptions of representation is robust to this model specification.

Table B.5 Conditional Effect of Personal Vote-Seeking Incentives on Working-Class Rep.

	Approve		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.07***	.13***	.07***	.06	.07***	.04
	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.04)
Personal Vote Seeking	.03	.07*	.02	.02	.02	-.01
	(.03)	(.04)	(.02)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)
% Workers in Legislature # Personal Vote Seeking		-.01		.00		.01
		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01**	-.01**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.16***	.16***	.19***	.19***	.19***	.19***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Income	-.23***	-.23***	-.04	-.04	-.07	-.07
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)
Female	.19***	.19***	.12***	.12***	.13***	.13***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.10***	.10***	-.02	-.02	.19***	.19***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Ideology=4-5	.10***	.10***	.05*	.05*	.19***	.19***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Ideology=6-7	.22***	.22***	.25***	.25***	.37***	.37***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.30***	.30***	.45***	.45***	.48***	.48***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.11***	.11***	.23***	.23***	.14***	.14***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.50***	-.50***	-.35***	-.35***	-.41***	-.41***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Married	-.02	-.02	-.07***	-.07***	-.05*	-.05*
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Divorced	-.08**	-.08**	-.02	-.02	-.11**	-.11**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Country-Level Control						
%Left Party in Legislature	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01	-.00	-.01
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
GNI per capita	2.20*	1.57	2.75**	2.88**	1.24	1.63
	(1.26)	(1.30)	(1.10)	(1.17)	(1.28)	(1.34)
Observations	41830	41830	42699	42699	25170	25170
Country-Year N=	31	31	31	31	25	25
Wald Chi²	1318.01	1321.23	1469.75	1469.93	837.45	838.72

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.

Note: If only citizens in countries with strong personal vote-seeking incentives were aware of working-class representation (or if working-class representation were only important in countries with strong personal vote seeking incentives) we would expect the relationship between *percent workers* and each of our dependent variables to be conditional on *personal vote-seeking incentives*. We find the interaction term is insignificant in each of the three interactive models (approval, trust, and accomplishment), but the direct effect of *percent workers* and each of the dependent variables is positive and statistically significant in the three baseline models. See Figure B4 for the distribution of personal vote-seeking incentives across the country-years in the analysis.

Figure B.4 Distribution of Personal Vote-Seeking Incentives in Latin America

Personal Vote-Seeking Incentives

Note: Figure B4 shows the number of country-years for each category of personal vote-seeking incentives (PVI) in our sample using the Johnson and Wallack (2012) coding. Theoretically, this measure ranges from 1 (lowest PVI) to 13 (highest PVI). The vast majority of country-years are in the lower PVI categories.

Table B.6 Working-Class Rep. and Perceptions of Leg., Control for Programmatic Parties

	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.08***	.08**	.06***	.07**	.08***	.07**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Working Class Citizen		.10**		.06		.08*
		(.04)		(.04)		(.05)
% Workers in Legislature X Working Class Citizen		-.00		-.01		-.01
		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01**	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.16***	.17***	.19***	.18***	.19***	.17***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Income	-.23***	-.20***	-.04	-.20***	-.07	-.19**
	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)
Female	.19***	.17***	.12***	.07***	.13***	.12***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.10***	.07	-.02	-.00	.19***	.19***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.06)
Ideology=4-5	.10***	.03	.05*	.08*	.19***	.18***
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=6-7	.22***	.20***	.25***	.24***	.37***	.35***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.30***	.27***	.45***	.43***	.48***	.47***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.00**	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.11***	.11***	.22***	.25***	.14***	.15***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.50***	-.54***	-.35***	-.35***	-.41***	-.42***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Married	-.02	.00	-.07***	-.05	-.05*	-.00
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Divorced	-.08**	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.11**	-.00
	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)
Country-Level Control						
Programmatic Parties	.02	-.04	.10	.02	-.01	.02
	(.11)	(.11)	(.09)	(.10)	(.11)	(.11)
%Left Party in Legislature	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01*	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
GNI per capita	2.16	2.14	2.03	2.78*	1.48	1.43
	(1.59)	(1.63)	(1.36)	(1.53)	(1.61)	(1.60)
Observations	41830	19328	42699	19503	25170	12948
Country-Year N=	31	25	31	25	19	18
Wald Chi²	1316.35	695.28	1469.89	651.31	836.50	400.93

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.

Note: We control for programmatic parties in place of personal vote-seeking incentives as an alternative measure of the party system. Programmatic political parties provide voters with meaningful choice over policies by developing coherent political platforms and focusing on policy outcomes rather than clientelism. In their attempt to offer voters with meaningful choices and representation, it is possible that programmatic political parties are more likely to recruit members of the working class to run for office and to incorporate workers into politics. It is also possible that citizens are more likely to trust/approve of legislatures and to believe they have accomplished

everything they wished in countries with programmatic political parties. Here, we demonstrate the results are robust when controlling for a measure of programmatic party systems from the Varieties of Democracy project.

Table B.7 Working-Class Rep, Perceptions of the Legislature, & Party System Fragmentation

	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.07***	.06**	.06***	.07***	.07***	.06**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Working Class Citizen		.10**		.06		.08*
		(.04)		(.04)		(.05)
% Workers in Legislature X Working Class Citizen		-.00		-.01		-.01
		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01**	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.16***	.17***	.19***	.18***	.19***	.17***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Income	-.23***	-.20***	-.04	-.20***	-.08	-.19**
	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)
Female	.19***	.17***	.12***	.07***	.13***	.12***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.10***	.07	-.02	-.00	.19***	.19***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.06)
Ideology=4-5	.10***	.03	.05*	.07*	.19***	.18***
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=6-7	.22***	.20***	.25***	.24***	.37***	.35***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.30***	.27***	.45***	.43***	.48***	.47***
	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.00**	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.11***	.11***	.22***	.25***	.14***	.15***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.50***	-.54***	-.35***	-.35***	-.41***	-.42***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Married	-.02	.00	-.07***	-.05	-.05*	-.00
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Divorced	-.08**	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.11**	-.00
	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)
Country-Level Control						
Party System Fragmentation	-.04	-.04	-.06	-.06	-.04	-.04
	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
%Left Party in Legislature	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01*	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
GNI per capita	2.56**	2.03	3.20***	3.37***	1.58	1.81
	(1.29)	(1.38)	(1.10)	(1.25)	(1.27)	(1.32)
Observations	41830	19328	42699	19503	25170	12948
Country-Year N=	31	25	31	25	19	18
Wald Chi²	1317.05	695.95	1471.10	655.37	837.57	401.90

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.

Note: We control for party system fragmentation in place of personal vote-seeking incentives as an alternative measure of the party system. Party fragmentation theoretically could influence the election of more workers to office by increasing the likelihood that far-left socialist or worker's parties win seats in office. Higher fragmentation may also be associated with better trust/approval as voters may feel like a wider range of voices is represented in politics. To assess whether party fragmentation is influencing both our dependent and independent variables we

control for fragmentation in the party system (Bormann and Golder 2013). Our results are robust to the inclusion of this measure in the model.

Table B.8 Bivariate Relationship between Working-Class Legislators and Perceptions of Representation

	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Workers in the Legislature	.03**	.07**	.05*	.05**	.06**	.06***
	(.01)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)
Observations	31	48757	31	49844	19	29182
Country-Year N=	31	31	31	31	19	19
R^2 / *Wald Chi²*	.18	6.27	.12	4.17	.28	7.04

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors)

Models 1, 3, and 5 are OLS coefficients for the mean of each country-year DV regressed on p*ercent worker*s in the legislature. Models 2, 4, and 6 are bivariate multilevel ordered logit coefficients.

Table B.9 Working-Class Representation and Perceptions of Representation, Linear Model

	Approval		Trust		Accomplishment	
% Workers in Legislature	.03***	.03***	.07***	.07***	.07***	.06**
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Working Class Citizen		.05**		.06		.06
		(.02)		(.04)		(.04)
% Workers in Legislature X Working Citizen		-.00		-.01		-.01
		(.00)		(.01)		(.01)
Individual-Level Control						
Education	-.01***	-.01***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01***	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Political Interest	.07***	.07***	.18***	.17***	.16***	.15***
	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Income	-.10***	-.09**	-.05	-.21***	-.09*	-.18**
	(.02)	(.03)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.08)
Female	.08***	.07***	.11***	.06**	.12***	.11***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Ideology=Left (1-3)	.05***	.03	-.01	.01	.17***	.18***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Ideology=4-5	.05***	.01	.04*	.06	.14***	.13***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)
Ideology=6-7	.10***	.09***	.23***	.21***	.31***	.30***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)
Ideology=Right (8-10)	.14***	.12***	.43***	.40***	.41***	.41***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)
Age	-.00***	-.00***	-.00	-.00**	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Rural	.05***	.05***	.22***	.24***	.12***	.13***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Economic Perception (Worse)	-.23***	-.25***	-.34***	-.33***	-.36***	-.37***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Married	-.01	-.00	-.06***	-.04	-.05*	-.01
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Divorced	-.04**	-.04	-.02	-.02	-.11***	-.02
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(.06)
Country-Level Control						
Personal Vote-Seeking	.01	.01	.02	.03	.02	.02
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
%Left Party in Legislature	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01*	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
GNI per capita	.88*	.61	2.52**	2.52**	.93	1.15
	(.53)	(.58)	(1.04)	(1.19)	(1.12)	(1.17)
Observations	41830	19328	42699	19503	25170	12948
Country-Year N=	31	25	31	25	18	18
Wald Chi²	1364.72	724.32	1535.91	688.64	853.32	405.97

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 (standard errors), multilevel linear regression coefficients.
Political ideology=no response and Marital status=single are excluded as reference categories.
Figure B7 uses the baseline models to graph the relationship between *percent workers* and the outcome variables.

Figure B.5 Working-Class Legislators and Perceptions of Representation, Linear Model

Note: Figure shows the expected value (solid line) of each outcome variable across the range of *percent workers* in the sample. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Expected values were calculated using the results in Table B9, Models 1, 3, and 5.

On average, higher levels of working-class descriptive representation are associated with higher expected values of legislative approval, trust, and accomplishment.