Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. A theory of legislative collaboration 3. Can democracy be collaborative? Examining patterns of collaboration 4. Why do women collaborate? Evidence of women's marginalization 5. When do women collaborate? Explaining between-chamber variation 6. When do women collaborate? Explaining within-chamber variation 7. Collaboration in a cross-national context 8. Conclusion |
Chapter Overviews
Chapter 2: A Theory of Legislative Collaboration
This chapter develops my theory of legislative collaboration. The chapter is organized around the three main questions examined in the book: 1) Can democracy be collaborative? 2) Why do women collaborate? 3) When do women collaborate? I tackle each of these questions and develop a set of expectations that I empirically evaluate in the following chapters.
Chapter 3: Can Democracy be Collaborative? Examining Patterns of Collaboration
In this chapter I empirically addresses the question: Can democracy be collaborative? I show, using bill cosponsorship data, that collaboration is widespread in the Argentine provinces. To do this, I first examine legislators’ motivations for cosponsoring legislation and explain why bill cosponsorship is the best measure of collaboration in Argentina. Then, I examine patterns of collaboration across different groups of legislators. I show that those legislators who have the least amount of power in the chamber are most likely to collaborate, and that women are more likely to collaborate than men.
Chapter 4: Why do Women Collaborate? Evidence of Women's Marginalization
This chapter turns to my second question: Why do women collaborate? I argue that women collaborate more than men because they are marginalized in legislatures. I present empirical evidence that women face structural barriers that limit their influence in the policy-making process. In legislatures, power is distributed via leadership posts and powerful committee appointments. I compare women’s and men’s leadership appointments and committee posts to show that women are underrepresented in positions of power and consequently do not have the same opportunities as male legislators to influence the policy-making process.
Chapter 5: When do Women Collaborate? Explaining Between-Chamber Variation
This is the first of two chapters that investigate the question: When do women collaborate? I argue that all women have an incentive to collaborate to overcome their marginalized status in legislatures and to attain political power, but that women’s collaboration varies between and within chambers because not all women have the same electoral incentive or institutional opportunities to collaborate. Chapter 5 examines how women’s collaboration varies between chambers as a function of partisan constraints and women’s numeric representation. I show that women’s collaboration is most likely to unfold where party leaders exercise little control over legislative behavior and women’s propensity to collaborate increases when they comprise larger proportions of the chamber. By comparison, in districts where party leaders exercise more constraint over legislators’ behavior, women are only marginally more likely than men to collaborate with other women and their propensity to do so decreases when women comprise a larger share of the chamber.
Chapter 6: When do Women Collaborate? Explaining Within-Chamber Variation
This chapter examines how women’s legislative collaboration varies within chambers as a function of affiliation with the governor’s party, seniority status, and the policy domain. I show that female members of the executive’s party – who are subject to fewer partisan constraints – are systematically more likely than women from the opposition party to collaborate with women. With respect to seniority, I show that women who have served previous terms in the legislature are systematically more likely than their junior colleagues to cross party lines to collaborate with female colleagues – indicating that senior legislators are more willing to defy party norms. As for women’s issues, women are even more inclined to collaborate when working on issues that disproportionately influence the lives of women.
Chapter 7: Collaboration in a Cross-National Context
The final empirical chapter in my book presents a set of case studies to facilitate the exploration of how institutional arrangements structure women’s collaboration outside of the Argentine provinces. I draw on the Rwandan Parliament, the U.S. Senate, the Uruguayan Congress, and the South African Parliament to demonstrate the generalizability of my argument beyond Argentina. In doing so, I examine countries with different legislative contexts than the ones found in Argentina, thus providing broader tests of how other legislative contexts constrain or facilitate women’s collaboration. I argue that, consistent with my theory, women’s marginalization motivates collaboration in each of these cases. But, whether or not collaboration unfolds depends on a combination of party constraints and women’s numeric representation in each country. In addition to examining chambers with different legislative rules, these case studies adopt different measures of collaboration that focus on multiple aspects of the policy-making process. In the case studies, I account for more informal types of collaboration that emerge in the legislature and during different phases of the policy-making process.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
The final chapter of the book begins with a summary of the theory and central findings, and synthesizes findings from the country case studies and cross-chamber analyses. I conclude by discussing the broader implications of my theory for thinking about collaboration beyond women’s marginalization, the advancement of women’s rights agendas, electoral system design, and collaboration among other historically marginalized groups in legislatures. First, my theory argues that marginalization motivates women’s collaboration. As women make gains in the legislature, they may begin to achieve equal access to power, and their incentives to collaborate may shift. Yet I explain that collaboration – like other legislative norms – will likely become institutionalized and transcend women’s marginalization. Second, I discuss the implications of my research for a better understanding of how champions of women’s rights legislation can effectively work within different types of legislatures to get women’s rights legislation on the political agenda and shepherd this legislation through the policy-making process. Third, I explain that although, at face value, these findings appear to imply a direct trade off between institutions that facilitate the election of women to office, and those that stimulate collaboration among women, this trade off is not clear-cut. Instead, the findings from this book suggest that there may be a sweet spot – some combination of electoral systems that are conducive to both women’s numeric representation and women’s collaboration. Finally, I consider how my theory may be generalized to better understand legislative collaboration of other historically marginalized groups. In doing so I explain how different institutions designed to increase the numeric representation of historically marginalized groups shape both the incentives and the opportunities for these groups to collaborate in office.
This chapter develops my theory of legislative collaboration. The chapter is organized around the three main questions examined in the book: 1) Can democracy be collaborative? 2) Why do women collaborate? 3) When do women collaborate? I tackle each of these questions and develop a set of expectations that I empirically evaluate in the following chapters.
Chapter 3: Can Democracy be Collaborative? Examining Patterns of Collaboration
In this chapter I empirically addresses the question: Can democracy be collaborative? I show, using bill cosponsorship data, that collaboration is widespread in the Argentine provinces. To do this, I first examine legislators’ motivations for cosponsoring legislation and explain why bill cosponsorship is the best measure of collaboration in Argentina. Then, I examine patterns of collaboration across different groups of legislators. I show that those legislators who have the least amount of power in the chamber are most likely to collaborate, and that women are more likely to collaborate than men.
Chapter 4: Why do Women Collaborate? Evidence of Women's Marginalization
This chapter turns to my second question: Why do women collaborate? I argue that women collaborate more than men because they are marginalized in legislatures. I present empirical evidence that women face structural barriers that limit their influence in the policy-making process. In legislatures, power is distributed via leadership posts and powerful committee appointments. I compare women’s and men’s leadership appointments and committee posts to show that women are underrepresented in positions of power and consequently do not have the same opportunities as male legislators to influence the policy-making process.
Chapter 5: When do Women Collaborate? Explaining Between-Chamber Variation
This is the first of two chapters that investigate the question: When do women collaborate? I argue that all women have an incentive to collaborate to overcome their marginalized status in legislatures and to attain political power, but that women’s collaboration varies between and within chambers because not all women have the same electoral incentive or institutional opportunities to collaborate. Chapter 5 examines how women’s collaboration varies between chambers as a function of partisan constraints and women’s numeric representation. I show that women’s collaboration is most likely to unfold where party leaders exercise little control over legislative behavior and women’s propensity to collaborate increases when they comprise larger proportions of the chamber. By comparison, in districts where party leaders exercise more constraint over legislators’ behavior, women are only marginally more likely than men to collaborate with other women and their propensity to do so decreases when women comprise a larger share of the chamber.
Chapter 6: When do Women Collaborate? Explaining Within-Chamber Variation
This chapter examines how women’s legislative collaboration varies within chambers as a function of affiliation with the governor’s party, seniority status, and the policy domain. I show that female members of the executive’s party – who are subject to fewer partisan constraints – are systematically more likely than women from the opposition party to collaborate with women. With respect to seniority, I show that women who have served previous terms in the legislature are systematically more likely than their junior colleagues to cross party lines to collaborate with female colleagues – indicating that senior legislators are more willing to defy party norms. As for women’s issues, women are even more inclined to collaborate when working on issues that disproportionately influence the lives of women.
Chapter 7: Collaboration in a Cross-National Context
The final empirical chapter in my book presents a set of case studies to facilitate the exploration of how institutional arrangements structure women’s collaboration outside of the Argentine provinces. I draw on the Rwandan Parliament, the U.S. Senate, the Uruguayan Congress, and the South African Parliament to demonstrate the generalizability of my argument beyond Argentina. In doing so, I examine countries with different legislative contexts than the ones found in Argentina, thus providing broader tests of how other legislative contexts constrain or facilitate women’s collaboration. I argue that, consistent with my theory, women’s marginalization motivates collaboration in each of these cases. But, whether or not collaboration unfolds depends on a combination of party constraints and women’s numeric representation in each country. In addition to examining chambers with different legislative rules, these case studies adopt different measures of collaboration that focus on multiple aspects of the policy-making process. In the case studies, I account for more informal types of collaboration that emerge in the legislature and during different phases of the policy-making process.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
The final chapter of the book begins with a summary of the theory and central findings, and synthesizes findings from the country case studies and cross-chamber analyses. I conclude by discussing the broader implications of my theory for thinking about collaboration beyond women’s marginalization, the advancement of women’s rights agendas, electoral system design, and collaboration among other historically marginalized groups in legislatures. First, my theory argues that marginalization motivates women’s collaboration. As women make gains in the legislature, they may begin to achieve equal access to power, and their incentives to collaborate may shift. Yet I explain that collaboration – like other legislative norms – will likely become institutionalized and transcend women’s marginalization. Second, I discuss the implications of my research for a better understanding of how champions of women’s rights legislation can effectively work within different types of legislatures to get women’s rights legislation on the political agenda and shepherd this legislation through the policy-making process. Third, I explain that although, at face value, these findings appear to imply a direct trade off between institutions that facilitate the election of women to office, and those that stimulate collaboration among women, this trade off is not clear-cut. Instead, the findings from this book suggest that there may be a sweet spot – some combination of electoral systems that are conducive to both women’s numeric representation and women’s collaboration. Finally, I consider how my theory may be generalized to better understand legislative collaboration of other historically marginalized groups. In doing so I explain how different institutions designed to increase the numeric representation of historically marginalized groups shape both the incentives and the opportunities for these groups to collaborate in office.